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Adjustment to Misfortune-A Problem of Social-Psychological Rehabilitation

Tamara Dembo, Ph.D., *
Gloria Ladieu Leviton, Ph.D., *
Beatrice A. Wright, Ph.D. *

Dedicated to the memory of Kurt Lewin

At particular times in the history of science, particular problems become ripe for investigation. A precipitating event brings them to the attention of a single person and sometimes to that of several at the same time. It is therefore understandable that during World War II the need was felt to investigate the problems of social psychological rehabilitation of the physically handicapped and that someone should look for a place and the means to set up a research project that would try to solve some of these problems. In pursuit of such a goal a research group was established at Stanford University on February 1, 1945. Conducted partially under a contract between Stanford University and the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (recommended by the Committee on Medical Research), partially under a contract between the University and the Army Medical Research and Development Board of the Office of the Surgeon General, War Department, the work continued until April 1, 1948.

To investigate the personal and social problems of the physically handicapped, two groups of subjects were needed—people who were considered handicapped and people around them. Therefore, as subjects of the research both visibly injured and noninjured people were used. Interviews were employed as the primary method of investigation, the great majority of the 177 injured persons interviewed being servicemen or veterans of World War II. More than half the subjects had suffered amputations and almost one fourth facial disfigurements. The injured man was asked questions designed to elicit his expectations, experiences, and feelings in his dealings with people around him. Sixty five noninjured people also were interviewed in regard to their feelings toward the injured man.

A first task in the research project was to determine the meaning of the relationship between the injured and the noninjured. Was it primarily that of the helper and the helped, of the curious onlooker and the one who is looked upon, of the independent and dependent person, the one who rejects and the one who is rejected, the person who pities and the one who is pitied? All these relationships exist between the injured and the noninjured. Some of them were described during the first period of the research program. As the research proceeded, it was seen that one particular relationship between the injured and the noninjured was more "basic" than others—basic in the sense that it underlies and determines the character of other relationships. This underlying relationship is the one which exists when a person who regards himself as fortunate regards another as unfortunate. We learned that to understand this relationship one has to see "being unfortunate" as a value loss and, furthermore, that the adjustment of this relationship involves the problem of acceptance of loss—a case of value change.

In current psychology, the problem of acceptance of loss is hardly investigated. Loss is usually seen as an end point of unsuccessful, goal directed behavior (failure) or else it is investigated in terms of the effect of failure on further goal directed behavior (such as on setting the next "level of aspiration"). But it is important to know what loss means to the person himself, how it affects the opinions and behavior of others toward him, and what acceptance of loss implies. Too often life is seen as a series of goal directed acts, whereas the consumption of gains and the acceptance (or nonacceptance) of losses which result from those acts are disregarded.

Almost all people are at some time faced with the necessity of adjusting to loss. In investigating the problems of injured people, therefore, we are dealing not only with special problems of a special group but with problems important to all. If we state that the injured need psychological rehabilitation or adjustment, this in no way implies that they are not "normal." The impact of loss which they experience produces suffering and difficulties. The overcoming of psychological suffering, whether or not it threatens mental illness, is a problem of adjustment.

This monograph is written as a scientific paper and no attempts at popularization are made. Popularization of our findings is a special task—a task which, if skillfully done, would indeed be useful for the information and education of the general public. Those who are not specially concerned with methodological and theoretical considerations may still find the less technical chapters (Chapters V through VII) of interest. The first four chapters and the last one will be of greater interest to the theoretical psychologist.

Part I introduces the general field of social emotional relationships. It deals with our approach and viewpoints regarding problems, data, theory, and measurement. We tried to examine the appropriateness of scientific beliefs and attitudes for the new area investigated. Part II deals with the investigation of the visibly injured, a group which, in our culture, is frequently considered unfortunate. Chapter IV presents the procedures used and their rationale. Chapter V discusses devaluation, by the noninjured, of the injured as people who have experienced a misfortune a value loss. Chapter VI is concerned with the reactions of the noninjured to the suffering aspect of misfortune rather than to its value loss aspect. The structure or nature of the genuine, positive feelings of sympathy is outlined. Chapter VII deals with the problem of overcoming suffering through acceptance of loss. In Chapter VIII we attempt to point out the direction which future research may take. The appendices include sample interviews with injured and noninjured subjects and a brief summary of methods other than interviews that were tried out in our study.*

Three years in a new and relatively unexplored field has to be considered a pilot period. After exploration the field is seen to be fruitful, both for the growth of ideas on the specific topics and also for the development of more general theoretical problems in psychology. But only a beginning has been made, and the material here presented is therefore properly viewed only in the light of its pioneer character.

Many of our findings may from the theoretical standpoint be seen as more precise statements of problems awaiting further investigation. From the practical standpoint, the study may be useful to those who critically examine the findings, not with the orientation of translating them into rules of behavior but so that their understanding of the problems involved in loss may be broadened. The injured, we hope, will find this type of investigation promising in its attempts to lead people to feel that it is not the AMPUTATED LIMB and John Doe but John Doe, the person, who really exists.

Part I: Methodological and Theoretical Considerations Concerning Social Emotional Relationships

Chapter I: Some Characteristics of Social Emotional Relationships

We shall present a list of pairs of words designating social emotional relationships. We ask you, the reader, to think about the feelings connoted. Specific points to consider may be seen in the first example, the idea of "abandonment." How does the abandoner feel? How does the abandoned feel? How do they feel toward each other? How do you, as a person not involved in the interaction, evaluate abandonment? As you proceed down the list, you should ask yourself these and any other questions you think of which bring out the emotional meanings of the interaction concerned. We ask you to work hard because in so doing we think that you will see the problems of the psychology of emotions in a very different way from the orientation given them traditionally. You will see this field not only as unexplored but also as full of psychological resources available to those who are ready to dig. Here is the list:

• To abandon — to be abandoned.
• To abhor — to be abhorred.
• To feel that someone is able — to feel that another considers you able.
• To consider someone abnormal — to be considered abnormal.
• To be abrupt — to be exposed to abruptness
• To consider someone absurd — to be considered absurd.
• To abuse — to be abused
• To accept another person — to be accepted.
• To feel in accord with someone — to feel that another person is in accord with you.
• To accuse — to be accused.
• To become accustomed to someone — to have someone become accustomed to you.
• To consider someone as an acquaintance — to be considered an acquaintance.
• To acquit someone — to be acquitted.
• To act in a given way, without actually feeling that way — to feel that someone is just acting.
• To adapt yourself to someone — to feel that another person is adapting himself to you.
• To help someone become adjusted — to have someone try to adjust you.
• To admire — to be admired.
• To admit to someone — to get an admission.
• To adopt — to be adopted.
• To adore — to be adored.
• To advise — to be advised.
• To feel affable — to feel that another person is affable.
• To give affection — to get affection.
• To affront — to be affronted.
• To be against someone — to feel that another person is against you.
• To aggravate someone — to be aggravated by someone.
• To be aggressive toward someone — to feel that another person is aggressive toward you.
• To agree with someone — to feel that another person agrees with you.
• To aid someone — to be aided.
• To alarm someone — to be alarmed by someone.
• To give an alibi — to get an alibi.
• To consider someone an alien — to be considered an alien.
• To allow someone — to do something to be allowed.

Only a few of the diverse emotions or feelings are mentioned above. They were selected from the first 20 pages of The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (New York, 1927), which has 1010 pages. The list might have impressed you with the tremendous number of unexplored problems in the area of emotions. You might have wanted to take stock of the actual concern shown them in textbooks and courses and in current research in the field of emotions. The psychological structure and the functions of the majority of emotional relationships are unknown. Yet these problems practically do not exist as topics of systematic investigation. At the 1947 meeting of the American Psychological Association, only four of some 200 papers fell under the program headed Emotions. The program on Emotions was sponsored by the Division of Physiological and Comparative Psychology.

We do not wish to imply that emotional problems are completely disregarded by psychologists. The psychology of personality, social psychology, and abnormal psychology do take them into account, but within these divisions other problems, particularly problems of needs and goal directed behavior, have been in the center of attention.

Evaluation by the Outsider

When you were asked to evaluate the emotional relationships given in the list, you may have felt uncomfortable because of a vague feeling indoctrinated into all of us that in science one should be nonevaluative. Whether a psychologist should or can be nonevaluative is not our present topic. Rather, we are concerned with emotional relationships which are considered by people at large, with or without the permission of the scientist, as desirable or undesirable, good or bad. It is simply an undeniable psychological phenomenon that evaluations are made, and as phenomena they cannot be disregarded. In fact, these evaluations, as shall be seen, are important for the understanding of the dynamics of emotional interpersonal relationships and the problem of adjustment of these relationships.

If one considers the relationships in the list, it is noticed that, even though no specification is given of the conditions under which they exist, some of them connote undesirable feelings and states, others more desirable ones. Examples which fall into the negatively evaluated group are "to abuse," "to abhor," "to accuse," "to affront." Examples which fall into the positively evaluated group are "to accommodate," "to admire," "to allow." There are others which seem less definitely to belong to the negative or positive group. For example, "to get accustomed," "to admit." Such abstract evaluations are not made specifically in terms of the meaning of the relationship to either of the partners. They are given by a person who psychologically takes the position of an outsider.

Evaluations of outsiders very often show a high level of agreement, as is easily demonstrated by a simple experiment. The list of words can be presented rapidly to a group of subjects who are asked to evaluate the relationship as positive or negative from the standpoint of an outsider to the relationship. In only a few instances will there be disagreement, and these disagreements will be due largely to what amounts to a violation of the instructions: for instance, the subject may "take sides" with one of the partners, or the subject may base his reply on the circumstances of particular situations.

Evaluations of outsiders might be considered standards of cultural judgment. It may be the high agreement in the evaluations of outsiders which make them appear to have the role of common cultural standards. It might be interesting to investigate whether some of them are not, in fact, intercultural. The common cultural standards play a not unimportant role in the life of human beings. For example, they strongly determine reputations and the jury's verdict of life or death.

Evaluations by Donor and Recipient

In any relationship, the person who bestows the emotion may be called the "donor," and the person upon whom the emotion is bestowed may be called the "recipient." The difference in the meaning of the relationship for the donor and the recipient is frequently very great. To give an appreciation of this difference, the list was arranged in pairs. You were asked to feel the way the donor in the relationship might feel and the way the recipient might feel. "To abuse or to be abused, to accept or to be accepted" are emotionally far apart. Sometimes both donor and recipient will evaluate a given relationship in the same way. But since the meaning which the relationship has for one partner is not the same as that given to it by the other, their evaluations often differ, and this difference may produce difficulties in the relationship. Help, for example, is almost always seen as positive for the recipient as judged by the donor, but as judged by the recipient it often has both positive and negative aspects. It is important for adjustment of relationships to know the conditions under which the donor and the recipient give the same evaluations and, when they do not, to find ways of producing a change which will lead to agreement in evaluation.

The donor and recipient not infrequently attempt to overcome the difficulties resulting from their different evaluations by urging each other to "be objective." But objectivity, in the sense of assuming the position of an outsider and giving abstract evaluations, is not what is really desired. What each really wants is that the partner should "understand" him, i.e., should understand the meanings the relationship has for him. He wants the other to take his (the first's) position and from this standpoint to think, evaluate, and act.

Scope of Meanings and Structure of Relationship

It is seen from the list that a great variety of social emotional relationships exist and that each is characterized not merely by pleasantness or unpleasantness but by a diversity of qualitative connotations. It might be agreed, for example, that one feels lost and hurt when abandoned or that one may feel free and at the same time guilty when abandoning someone. It may also be agreed that one will feel aversion for, and a desire to escape from, one abhorred and that one would feel rejected and resentful if a person abhorred him. Each connotation will be referred to as a "meaning" of an emotional relationship. The diverse, sometimes apparently contradictory meanings which an emotional relationship can have for different people under different circumstances build the "scope of meanings of a social emotional relationship."

As an illustration, we present some of the meanings which "being helped" has for the injured: it means that a goal is made accessible; it means that another person is courteous and polite; it means that the injured person is in a position of lower status; it means dependence, burden, etc.. We assume that these meanings are not merely a congeries of separate entities attached to the same word. Instead, we believe analysis will show that many of them hang together, that they may be integrated within one or more coherent structures.* When the structure of a relationship has been determined, it is sometimes found that some of the meanings which subjects give to the word do not belong to the relationship in question but to a different one. For instance, in the case of the sympathy relationship, the structure of which is described in Chapter VI (page 27), some of the subjects gave meanings which belong to the relationship of "pity," a relationship which has a different structure.

The determination of the scope of meanings seems to us an essential problem because it is the first step toward determining structures of relationships. The structure is a better description of the social emotional relationship than is the scope of meanings. Even before the development of the structure of a relationship, however, the determination of the scope of meanings has practical value. It permits realization of possibly disturbing connotations and encourages precautions and safeguards against them.

Chapter II: Qualitative versus Quantitative Approaches in a New Field

In a new field, the formulation of meaningful problems is a task in itself—a task which often takes much time and effort. It is easy within an hour or two to state a hundred questions, in a few days to state many more. Yet only a few of these will prove to be fruitful. The selection of problems which are scientifically promising is an extensive qualitative research job.

Essential questions are those which promise to become an integral part of an interrelated group of problems and to lead to the development of corresponding systems of concepts. In a new field neither the problems nor the systems are known. They have to be discovered by giving a "qualifying examination" to the problems and preconcepts which occur to us, since these include both promising and unpromising ones.* The qualifying examination consists of a test which shows whether a particular problem and preconcept with other "candidates" promise to form an interdependent team. When they not only develop but also add to the development of the emerging system, they acquire the position of fruitful essential problems and preconcepts.

Consider an example of a problem which does not seem promising, in the sense that it is likely to remain an isolated problem. It is noted that some of the items in the list connote what may more frequently be called feelings (e.g., "to abhor," "admire," "adore"). Others have the character of emotional acts (e.g., "to accuse," "advise," "acquiesce," "admit"). Still others reflect social distance (e.g., "to consider someone an acquaintance or an alien"). These categorizations seem, however, not to lead to further understanding. They simply fix the different relationships into more or less neat cubbyholes, which are, as far as we can see at the present time, blind alleys. In this example, categories rather than preconcepts are relied upon to "order" the facts. Only an orderly catalog instead of a system of interrelated dynamic concepts can be built up in such a way.

An example of a problem which we consider promising is the determination of value structures held by those people who are undergoing difficulties and by those who have overcome these difficulties. This, we believe, is one of the first steps in conceptualizing adjustive change (Chapters V, VII, VIII).

Another example of what might be considered promising for future investigation relates to the "mutual" relationship. When discussing the relationships in the previous chapter, all of our examples were of "onesided relationships." Each involved one donor and one recipient. But partners may abuse each other, accept each other, or admire each other. Each may be in the position of donor and recipient at the same time. Mutual and one sided relationships are not merely convenient methods of classification. They bring into focus a number of questions important dynamically.

It frequently happens that when a one sided relationship is unpleasant for the recipient, he will try to change it to a mutual one. For example, if he is being abused he may begin to abuse the other. What effect does this change produce? The question will be sharpened if we consider the following hypothetical statement:

R_p^rd = R_p^r + R_P^d,

where R_p indicates the person p's relationships, and d and r indicate the donor and recipient positions, respectively. In this statement, p's mutual relationship is a simple summation of his relationships as donor and recipient. Can this actually be the case? Are the meanings for p in the mutual relationships (R_p^rd) equal to the sum of meanings which the one sided relationship has for him when he is only a recipient (R_p^r) plus the meanings it has for him when he is a donor (R_p^d)? This question is important, for if the addition of the new meanings of the donor relationship does not change the old meanings of the recipient relationship, then the addition will not diminish the previously existing conflicts or difficulties.*Actually, the "adding" of new meanings may not be an addition at all but rather a re structurization of the first one sided relationship (i.e., a change in some of the meanings which the relationship originally had for the person). In the latter case we would have to study the type of change produced by the restructurization and the circumstances under which the change is adjustive.

At different stages of research, the "candidate problems" must be subjected to further test. For a time they might drop out from the "team," and then later their participation may again become fruitful. Within this process they may change their character and gain a new role.

The "candidate problems" are thoughts of the investigator, fed by qualitative observations and checked by them. For this type of work, an armchair and a pencil are more appropriate than a straight chair and a calculating machine. It might require self control on the part of the investigator to go on with conceptualization and qualitative analysis of data when he is constantly lured by more easily quantifiable, nonsystematic, isolated problems.

The Position of Measurement in Psychological Research

The attitude, "Investigate what you can measure," is not infrequently found in psychological research practice. But there is such a thing as primitive quantification. Quantification of data on systematically unimportant questions is primitive. And there is also such a thing as premature quantification. That quantification which is done before the laborious task of qualitative description of problems and concepts is sufficiently advanced is premature.*

The determination of statistically significant differences between two sets of data does not ensure that these data are important either practically or for further theoretical advance. Instead of regarding the statistical fact as an observation which needs anchoring in an explanatory system before its import can be judged, all too frequently such observations, by sheer virtue of their statistical nature, are held up as contributions in themselves. We do not declare that measurement should not be done without a well developed theoretical framework. But we do assert that such measurement often produces statistically significant differences on inessential details. And we further assert that where problems well grounded in theory have not as yet been formulated, data analyzed qualitatively may contribute far more to the understanding of important problems.

Where there is a well defined theoretical system, however, measurement has a very important and different position. Measurement in this case, as we see it, means measurement of conceptually defined constructs and the determination of interrelationships among those constructs. Preliminary to such measurements, one has to determine whether the constructs used permit metrization or whether nonmetrical mathematical (topological) statements should be made. The particular problems involved in this type of mathematical determination in psychology were first realized by Kurt Lewin in regard to problems of goal directed behavior. Such mathematical determination will have to be made in the field of emotions as in any other field, though it may take years before it is possible. In the meantime, sound investigation, systematic in nature, will have to be primarily qualitative.

There also may be considerable practical value in qualitative investigation before quantification is possible. The knowledge of what affects a given social emotional relationship, even if we are unable to indicate the strength of that factor, is of value. For example, we may not be able to state the extent to which sympathy reminds an injured person of the negative implications of his injury. The fact that sympathy may remind, however, immediately calls for caution in conveying compassion to the injured.

Concerning Frequency Counts

At any stage in theoretical development, one may tally the number of times a given observation occurs in the sample studied. But the meaning of such frequencies needs to be examined. The sheer number of occurrences does not indicate the relative importance of the event. We do not consider more important the fact that a person dealt honestly with us ten times than that he once cheated us. Nor can we say, without further proof, that there is a one to one relation between the strength of a factor and the frequency of its occurrence.

One function of frequency counts is to permit a more accurate prediction of the number of occurrences of like events in like populations. This function, however, is often limited by failure to define the research population in terms of systematically important factors.

Some Problems of Sampling

To "select" a population for research in a new field which lacks systematization is harmless but also meaningless and therefore to be rejected as impractical. The traditional parameters of age, IQ, socioeconomic status, and geographic location should not be thought of as automatic principles of selection. Their usefulness for the particular research has to be determined in each case. It may be, for example, that in research on the injured it would be more appropriate to define the sample in terms of preinjury attitudes toward the handicapped, relative evaluation of beauty and physical prowess as compared with other personality characteristics, and sensitivity to status position. A group which is homogeneous with regard to some arbitrarily selected factors will actually be heterogeneous with regard to those factors which prove to be of systematic importance.

Heterogeneity is, however, not a disadvantage. In an unstructured, new field, where the first task is to determine fruitful problems and the concepts to be used in their solution, the danger lies in overlooking diversities which should be taken into account. Heterogeneous groups which yield a wide range of differences in behavior are therefore welcomed. To narrow down the range of subjects is permissible only for a good reason. This reason has to be specified. In the beginning stages of our research on the social emotional relationships between visibly injured and noninjured persons, it was legitimate to include a variety of subjects. To have limited the investigation to, say, leg amputation cases, for the sole reason that in the interests of homogeneity the type of disability should be uniform, would have been groundless.

In later stages of research, the original sample might legitimately be narrowed down or enlarged, depending on the particular problem being pursued. For example, we have indications that a person's status values affect his attitudes toward such social emotional interactions as sympathy, help, curiosity, and so on. This suggested systematic relationship could be tested by narrowing down the sample so that but two groups would be included, one strongly status minded and the other not, according to certain criteria. Whether the expected differences are to be found could then be determined. As an example where an even more heterogeneous sample than the original one is indicated, we can present again an instance from our research. The understanding of problems of loss became clearer to us when the concept of misfortune was introduced. In light of this theoretical orientation, it undoubtedly would be fruitful for further research to enlarge the sample to include, in addition to the injured, other persons regarded as being in an unfortunate situation. In short, throughout research, the sample taken for study should be determined by the requirements of the problem being studied and not by applying sampling procedures which are either extraneous to the purpose of the research or else actually interfere with it.

Chapter III: The Interview as a Tool for Investigating Emotional Contents

The interview as an experimental tool is in disrepute with many present day investigators. Some investigators will go as far as to withdraw the honorable title of "real scientific endeavor" from a study which uses "just interviews" because interviews do not deal with how the person "actually behaves." In this chapter we shall examine the validity of this argument.

Reflection Units and Interaction Units

Consider this example: A young girl gets an invitation to a ball. She is full of anticipation perhaps she will be the belle. Perhaps a certain young man will dance often with her. She decides what gown she will wear and how to arrange her hair. She plans imaginary conversations with gallant partners. But she is anxious too. Maybe she will be a wallflower; maybe the young man will not even notice her. Finally, after a succession of alternating moods, the ball arrives. The social interaction which has occasioned so much thought and feeling actually takes place.

If, in the investigation of social emotional relationships, only interaction units were studied, a large part of the course of events would be neglected. Periods of reflection which include planning, expectations, evaluations, struggle with one's feelings and moods, would be excluded from study. Similarly, if in the investigation of personal emotional events only action units were studied, periods of reflection would be overlooked. The interactions or actions themselves might not be fully understood without the consideration of reflection units.

The high status position of interaction data as compared with the data of reflection units seems in part to be based upon a vague feeling that only interactions are "real facts." But the types of reflection units enumerated above are all real in the sense that they exist as psychological phenomena. Even if reflection units had a segregated existence and did not influence interaction units, they would still have to be studied as real psychological phenomena within the life of the person. The reflections themselves may produce pain and consequently require adjustment; for instance, a man with a scarred face believed that "no woman in her right mind could possibly accept me now."

Is it meaningful to ask whether interaction units are scientifically more real than reflection units? The frequently stated criterion of scientific reality, "What is real is what has effects," concerns not observable facts but the reality of descriptive, explanatory concepts. The reality of the effects is not under discussion in the criterion; nothing is implied about them but their virtue of being available for observation. Scientifically, reflection units and interaction units are both legitimate observable facts. It is true that in the case of reflection units the content must be communicated to the interviewer. But this mediation should be no more disturbing than that of other instruments. The criterion cited does not specify that the observable facts must be observed directly.*

What conclusions can be drawn as to the relative merits of the two types of units for study? Both interactions and reflections are real phenomena and legitimate observable facts; psychological difficulties requiring adjustment may exist in either case. They differ in that interactions can be observed directly, whereas the content of reflections must be communicated to the investigator by the subject. For an investigator, the difference between them is simply one of kind and not of value.

Interviews Versus Behavior Observations

We submit that the richness of emotional life can be more fully realized through the use of the interview than through observation of behavior. It is true that we can infer something about underlying emotions from behavioral observations, but the understanding gained in this way is usually more limited. If we could have observed the girl smiling over the invitation, taking from her wardrobe first one gown and then another, being absent minded about her everyday tasks, and so on, we might have been able to infer something about her feelings. But the complexity of her feelings, the content of her hopes and fears, remains largely unappreciated. On the other hand, for particular problems observation of behavior would be required, for example in order to study the effects of reflections on behavior, such as how fear of failure affects performance, or whether verbal attitudes correspond to behavior.* Only when a particular problem is specified may one method be judged better or worse than another.

Validity of Interviews Versus Validity of Behavior Observations

It is frequently stated that the subject willfully or otherwise does not tell the interviewer what he actually feels. But one cannot claim superiority for behavioral observations on these grounds. Hiding emotional contents is not limited to interviews. One can cover up one's real feelings with actions just as easily as with words. One can smile when he is sad just as easily as he can say he is well when he feels bad. Friendly acts may be due to bad intentions. They may be performed to cover up the real feelings behind them. One covers up if there is a need for it.

The need to hide during an interview, it might be argued, may frequently be less strong than in interaction units. It might be considered whether hiding of feelings from a person with whom they are connected is not frequently more necessary than when discussing or reflecting about these feelings with a third person. It is likely that feelings of guilt or shame will be less strong in regard to statements than to acts. Especially if the third person takes a nonjudgmental position or the position of an ally will the true feelings as far as they are recognized by the subject be expressed more openly than in interaction units. Of course the need to hide particular emotions will exist during interviews, but the interaction units cannot be turned to as the better ones in this respect.

Knowledge of the Subject About His Own Emotions

Interviews are sometimes held in disrepute on grounds that people do not know their own feelings. Has not depth psychology taught that people fool themselves? Does not the subject need first to be analyzed and to be an experienced psychiatrist or to have special training in psychological matters in order to be able to make pertinent statements? Fortunately, people do not learn to cognize feelings in college only. Much of what one feels when someone nags him, for example, or helps him, or when he is jealous, can be perceived without special psychological training.* If the objection is raised that the conscious meanings which feelings have for the subject are less important and more superficial than those of which he is not aware, we would say that such a statement is premature. Explicit criteria of importance have first to be given.

If important feelings are those which affect a person's behavior, we say that those consciously given share the same honors as the hidden. And if it is asserted that unconscious feelings are more important because they explain more of a person's behavior, one is called upon to compare counts. This has never been done, nor does it make sense to do so. For immediately the question arises as to what weights to assign to the individual behavior units. Are they more important because they are resisted? Then what is the rationale for considering the resisted more important? We suspect that all too often the hidden is identified with the important by sheer virtue of the fact of its covertness. Clearly missing is a link which must be supplied before such an evaluation can have scientific merit.

As far as we can see, it is scientifically meaningless to argue about the importance or superficiality of perceived meanings of feelings before the criteria of such judgments are made clear. One criterion does exist. If important problems are those which are essential in the sense discussed on page 8, i.e., problems which attempt to relate observable facts to systems of concepts, then there is nothing which leads us to exclude feelings as perceived by the subject as "candidates." Criticisms regarding essentiality of problems are applicable to overt and covert meanings alike.

Feeling Level Versus Intellectual Level of Discussion

Emotional topics can be discussed with almost anyone who is willing to participate in an interview. The discussion, however, may take place on an intellectual level or on a feeling level. One can "just talk about" feelings, in an abstract, impersonal way (intellectual level), or one can analyze one's feelings in terms of the particular intimate meanings they have for the individual (feeling level). Psychotherapy, whether directive or non directive, strives for such a feeling analysis by the patient. It has been commonly recognized that, in order for feeling analysis to take place, the person must have a need to examine his feelings, and he must expect the interviewer to be tactful, understanding, trustworthy, etc. In the study of the meanings which social emotional relations have for the donor and for the recipient, however, a further important condition must be realized. To approach such meanings on the feeling level, the subject must actually feel the position of a partner in the relationship. He must feel something of the hurt involved in being stared at, for example; or in the case of the donor position, something of the curiosity. It is more advantageous to select subjects who in actual life are donors or recipients in the relationship investigated. Otherwise the subject tends to discuss on the intellectual level or evaluate as an outsider, and in neither case can he convey the emotional impact which the relationship has for a partner.

Analysis of Data in the Area of Emotions

The principles which guided us in choosing methods of collecting data apply no less to its handling after it has been gathered. The whole flavor of the emotional meanings which one was at such pains to obtain can be lost if the approach to the data is unwisely rigid. The investigator is forced to perceive and to feel emotional relationships from the point of view of the donor and recipient before he can understand the meanings and evaluations ascribed to them. Not being involved in the particular relationship, the investigator has to find equivalent relationships in his own experience. Frequently in our research we had to feel through relationships from our own personal histories in order to be able emotionally to understand the subject's comments. Though the occasion at which sympathy, for instance, was given to us differed from the occasion leading to sympathy relationships in our subjects, the tool of self analysis was useful. There is an obvious danger of analyzing superficially similar relationships instead of equivalent ones. Self analysis, therefore, should be used for the purpose of getting "hunches" which can be applied to the data obtained from the subjects. Such an approach leads to aspects of data which an investigator, viewing the data as an outsider, will overlook or misinterpret.

There is nothing unscientific about being a subject and an investigator at the same time. In perception psychology, for example, the investigator frequently takes this double role. He can perceive and then cognize what he is perceiving. In the area of emotional problems, the investigator should try to feel the emotional situations being studied and then to examine what he is feeling. Physical, physiological, and psychological laws which hold for the object of the investigation hold for the investigator also. In investigating emotional relationships, to feel is at least as essential as to think.

If we state that one has to do not only a thorough job of thinking but also of feeling we make a realistic statement concerning the method of studying emotional relationships. Our view on the necessity of emotional understanding is not as radical as it may seem. Frequently in psychology statements are made that we have to investigate contents as they "exist for the subject," "what it means to the subject," "to see with the eyes of the subject." The need for feeling "like the subject feels" was long felt by therapists. The requirement of psychoanalysis that they themselves be analyzed is partially for the purpose of facilitating emotional understanding.

In attempting to find aspects under which the data may be fruitfully seen, complete freedom should be given to the investigator. He cannot be free enough and "wild" enough in looking for interpretations and possible implications of the raw data which might lead to hunches, hypotheses, and conceptual formulations. Hunches are freedom loving birds which do not hatch in supervised, restricted areas. This does not mean that the data will be distorted or that the results will be "only speculation" and not "facts." The test is whether, when a category has been well defined, independent observers will agree that given items of the raw data fit the category. If they do agree, then this aspect is indeed "an observable fact." If we are too "wild" in our interpretations, then we shall be caught by another observer. But if we are unwisely rigid we shall not be able to make a step in the direction of theoretical progress.

Part II: Study on the Visibly Injured - A Group Considered Unfortunate

Chapter IV: Research Procedures

Our approach to the problems of the social emotional relationships of the visibly injured was based on the theoretical and methodological considerations discussed in Part I. Because the task was that of determining essential problems in the new field of social emotional relationships, qualitative methods were chosen as the appropriate ones. Measurements at this time would have been premature. Frequencies of observations and statistical analysis are therefore not presented, since they would only be misleading.

Subjects

Heterogeneity of subjects, as has been seen, is an asset for such a study. The subjects (177 visibly injured and 65 noninjured persons) varied as to age, race, intelligence, socioeconomic background, occupational interests, marital status, and so on. The injuries varied. The relationship of the noninjured to the injured persons varied. To have narrowed the groups for the sole reason that they should be homogeneous would have given us a more limited picture of the emotional meanings of the relationships existing between the injured and the noninjured.

If, at the beginning of our investigation rather than at the end of it, we had known that the relationship of misfortune was especially important to the understanding of the problems studied, we would have considered it profitable to have included persons who experienced misfortunes other than injuries. But our research was an outgrowth of interest in the problems of the injured, and thus misfortunes other than visible injuries were not studied. Orthopedic cases and cases involving plastic surgery were chosen because the visibility of the injury is important in relationships with noninjured who are not close to the injured. Blind and deaf persons were excluded as subjects since it was felt at the time that the specific additional problem of communication between them and the noninjured would have in the beginning of the research unnecessarily complicated the data.

The ages of the injured subjects ranged from 19 to 58 years, the duration of their disabilities from two months to 33 years. Of the 177 injured subjects, 121 were hospitalized servicemen of World War II and four were women. (Table 1) presents the distribution of the subjects according to type of disability; (Table 2) gives the distribution of the non injured according to relationship with injured persons.

Interview Procedures

After having tried out several techniques of investigation, a summary of which is given in Appendix I, we found that the scope of meanings of social emotional relationships could most adequately be determined by interviews. Prior to the interview much work was done on the selection and formulation of questions, the purpose being not to set up a questionnaire for the interviewer to follow rigidly but rather to prepare him for the interview. We wish first to point out why we think it unnecessary and often disadvantageous to follow a rigid order and formulation of questions; then we would like to explain what we mean by "preparing the interviewer for the interview."

It was observed that, for at least three reasons, the actual course of events in an interview might require deviations from a prearranged interview. In the first place, identity of questions and order does not ensure that the psychological situation will be the same for different subjects. In many instances, a question will have the same meaning for each subject only when it is put in a different form. Thus, in our study, as well as in many investigations where comparisons among the subjects are made, rigid interview procedure is con traindicated. That we deny the necessity of maintaining a rigid formulation and order of questions does not imply that we disregard the influence of preceding events upon a given question. Rather, we assert that this kind of influence can be validly determined only when the analysis of data is made. A rigid order gives an "appearance" of the same conditions and illegitimately relieves the experimenter from investigating the effects of the actual psychological conditions upon the responses of the subject.

Secondly, a rigid interview leads in many cases to a more superficial intellectual discussion than is the case when the interviewer follows the natural course of the discussion. If a subject is developing a topic in a given direction and the interviewer goes on to the next question on the list, the interruption might be emotionally disturbing. Such interruptions promote the feeling that the interviewer is not really interested in what the subject is saying but just has to complete the task of getting answers to "twenty questions."

Finally, in a nonrigid interview the subject may introduce new topics which, in the exploratory stage of research, are often worthy of consideration.

To "prepare" or train the interviewer, the design and redesign of questions that might be asked in the interview is of extreme value. First, the process of developing questions sharpens the sensitivity of the interviewer to the scope of meanings which may be implied in a question and in possible answers to it. It prepares him to listen for the shades of meanings which the subject may bring out. Secondly, the interviewer, when later analyzing the interviews, will also be more sensitive to the shades of meanings implied in the subjects' statements. Third, the attention given in the training to the problem of the logic of transitions from one question to another and to the possible negative effects implied in some transitions is also important. The interviewer is then better able, when the subject waits for him to take the lead, to introduce a new topic without disrupting the relationship. And finally, the training on design of questions makes the interviewer realize what questions may be seriously disturbing to the subjects, a matter especially important with the injured subjects and their sharers for whom the injury is a vital problem not limited to the interview situation.

The design of questions to be used as guides for interviews in a new area is a serious and laborious task. During the research, changes in the original questions were made; some were dropped, others added. In successive interviews, the improved interview form served to suggest the areas to be brought up for discussion, but when and how they were to be introduced was left to the judgment of the trained interviewer. We present below one of the prearranged lists of questions which was developed during the training period and used as a guide in some interviews with injured subjects:

1. How do people act?
   • How should they treat you?
2. How about their asking questions?
3. How about help?
4. Do you think that noninjured people are uncomfortable when they are with you for instance are they at a loss for words?
   • Do you think they are afraid of hurting your feelings?
   • Do you try to put them at ease?
5. Do you think it wise for the uninjured to make light of the injury?
   • Do you think a person who is not injured should kid the man about the injury?
   • Is it good for them to tell an injured man about all the things that another injured man can do?
   • Is it good for them to tell a man that his injury is not noticeable?
6. Do you like to hear it said that the injured man is courageous?
7. What do you think comes into a person's mind when he sees someone with an amputation?
   • Do you think many people would feel sorry for him?
   • Would many people feel respect for him?
   • Is the opposite ever true? Would anybody look down on him?
8. Do other people react any differently from what you expected at first?
9. What percentage of people do you think act very well and really badly? How many in between?
10. How would you check whether a person has the right feeling toward injured people? Do you do anything like that?
11. Did you ever know anybody who was injured, before you were hurt? 11a. How did you feel about him?
    • Do you feel differently about them now?
12. What would you be careful of now when you're with another injured person?
13. Do you ever feel sorry for anyone around here?
14. Is there a bad kind of sympathy and a good kind?
    • Is there a kind you can't help?
15. Is pity different from feeling sorry?
16. Quite a number of things may be important for other people who are injured to know about the stages one goes through. It would help them to know they are not the only ones who have these feelings in the beginning. How was it at the beginning? What are the stages one has to go through and the things you have to get used to?
17. Do you think a person should try not to think about his injury?
18. Is it better if he thinks and talks about his injury in a matter of fact way, whenever there is any reason to think or talk about it?
19. What would you do if you saw a fellow patient who was feeling sorry for himself?
20. What kind of person will let his injury lick him, or get him down?
21. Do you think you would have been able to take it if it had been worse?
22. Does it help to know that another person was injured worse than you?
    • Is it because the other person is in a worse condition, or because even though he is in a worse condition he can still take it?
23. What things have you learned to do since you were wounded?
    • What things do you still have to learn?
24. Which is more important, the looks, or the things you can't do?
    • Does it matter much how it looks, either to other people, or to you? Do you have to get used to it?
25. Is an injury easier to take for a woman or a man? 25a. Would you object to marrying an injured woman?
26. Do the men feel that their injuries will make a difference in their getting married?
    • Let's say that about 70 out of 100 men are married in the general population. What would you expect about wounded people, would there be more of them married, or less, or about the same?
27. Are you satisfied with your stump?
    • Some people say that they get mad at the stump and try to hurt it. What do you think the reason might be?
    • Have you ever felt that way?
28. Are there some words you object to?
    • How about the word, stump?
29. Do you think that after an injury a man gets more interested in new things that didn't interest him before that he looks on life differently or that things that were important before don't seem important now while new things do?
    • Do you have any new plans for a job?
    • Do the same kind of people interest you?
30. There are a good many things we haven't talked about that might be very important, and we'd be glad to have your suggestions. Is there anything else that occurs to you that would be good for us to talk about?
    • Anything you think the wounded man ought to know?
    • Anything the public ought to know?

The interview usually lasted about an hour and a half. In a few instances, there were repeated interviews with the same subject. About half of the interviews were recorded by the interviewer himself as verbatim as possible, the others by a stenographer or a trained recorder. A sample interview with a noninjured subject is given in Appendix II. Sample interviews with three injured subjects are given in Appendix III.

The cooperation of the injured subjects was obtained by telling them that the purpose of the study was to determine difficulties existing in the relationships between injured and noninjured people and how these difficulties could be overcome. The subjects were asked to help in finding out "how people act" and "how they should act." The injured considered the endeavor a worthy one. Many of them challenged the usefulness of current magazine articles, and some felt that correct information might improve matters. The social emotional relationships discussed had a high potency for them. Many of the subjects were recently injured, but all of them had had contacts with the noninjured—contacts in which they were the recipients of help, of curiosity, of sympathy, of being considered an unfortunate person. For them, such relationships were real and vital. Because they mattered to them they discussed problems not only intellectually but also on the feeling level.

In the interview the injured subjects were first asked "how the noninjured behave and how they should behave." This confirmed the feeling which we had attempted to convey when we first approached them that we valued their opinions and knowledge as they "are the ones who really know." This openended question was also a precaution against feelings in the subject of intrusion into his privacy. Later in the interview, when the subjects became involved and felt secure and free with the experimenter, they frequently shifted to their own personal feelings and were even willing to discuss private matters brought up by the interviewer.

Since particularly during the war the feeling that something should be done to help the injured was strong, cooperation was also readily secured with the noninjured subjects when the purpose of the study was explained to them. At the beginning of the interview, however, it was a difficult task to achieve real emotional involvement on the part of those noninjured who were not close to injured persons. Noninjured persons who are in the position of sharers, wives and mothers of the injured for example, do feel that relationships between the injured and noninjured really concern them. But for other noninjured, the area of problems is not a vital one. Some time was therefore spent with subjects of this group at the beginning of the interview in discussion of injured persons they knew and how they felt about them in an attempt to bring the discussion to a more basic feeling level. In order to keep the subject on the feeling level, the interviewer also attempted to bring out the conflict in the noninjured between ethical demands and emotional feelings. Because it is considered "good" by the noninjured to believe that the injury does not matter to them, they may try to convince the interviewer and themselves that they do not have any "special feelings toward an injured person." When the interviewer responded to the underlying emotional feelings rather than to the overt ideological statements, the noninjured not infrequently became aware that the relationships involved important meanings for them and not merely intellectual or ideological ones. Discussion on the feeling level could then take place.

Analysis of Data

The analysis of data in a new field, where the aim is to discover essential problems, requires a great flexibility on the part of the investigator. Because the search is for "hunches" and connections among them and not for frequencies of occurrences, an attitude of a single subject in its ramifications requires much thought and understanding. For those who will work further in this field, we wish to mention some points which are well to keep in mind when analyzing interview material.

The understanding of the emotional meanings implied in the statements of the subject requires taking into account the context of the discussion. It is important to consider the interplay between the responses of the subject and those of the interviewer. Sometimes contradictory statements made by the subject in different portions of the interview lead to understanding of basic feelings. Always it is necessary to try to put oneself in the position of the subject and to feel with him. Often, in order to appreciate the subject's subtle feelings, it helps to examine one's own feelings in situations similar to those evaluated by the subject. Frequently the impact of the subject's own feelings is further enhanced if the investigator assumes the position of the other partner in the relationship he was talking about. In our work this was especially true in analyzing the noninjured records. The covert meanings appeared most clearly if we tried to see the implications which a superficially innocuous statement might have if an injured person were to read it.

A rigid scheme of analysis of interview material may lead to superficial conclusions; since in such a case one is obliged to cover the material in a technical, automatic way, the many meaningfulness of the single answer of the subjects is apt to be overlooked. Thus, for our purpose, the interview material was more fruitfully analyzed by developing categories as the analysis proceeded rather than by following a predetermined scheme. This meant categorizing, recategorizing, and again re categorizing. When a new category was added it sometimes required a re examination of parts of interviews in the light of the new insight gained. Not all of our theoretical statements, however, are based on category analysis of all the interviews. Sometimes the attitudes expressed in single cases gave us hunches which led to the development of hypotheses and theoretical understanding. In these ways we tried to determine the scopes of meanings and structures of social emotional relationships.

Chapter V: Misfortune

Many kinds of social-emotional relationships exist between injured and noninjured people. Which should be investigated as more essential? We began with those which were frequently pointed out by the injured themselves, namely, "to help—to be helped," "to question—to be questioned," "to stare—to be stared at," "to sympathize—to be sympathized with," "to accept—to be accepted."* During the analysis of data, a different relationship emerged as more basic for understanding the social psychological problems of the injured the relationship "to consider someone unfortunate to be considered unfortunate." This relationship enables us to tie together many of the phenomena observed and indicates the direction which further research should take. The finding and description of this essential relationship is a result rather than the historical beginning of our investigation.

An Experiment for the Reader

The line below represents a scale. The letter F designates the position of the most fortunate person and U the position of the most unfortunate. The sign in the middle of the scale designates the average position. Before reading the text further, quickly and going simply by feeling rather than on the basis of intellectual consideration indicate your own position on the line. (Fig. 1)

This experiment was performed with a group of 30 students at Stanford University but not in the context of a discussion about the injured. Only one of the group placed himself in the average position, none below this point. In a variation of the experiment with 10 other subjects, the instructions were changed so that the middle of the scale represented the average position for members of the subject's own social group. The "fortune phenomenon" still held in this case.*

We expect that you too will have put yourself somewhere above the average position. It would seem that there must be a "terrible misfortune," and even this may not suffice, to lead one to put himself below the average. One feels also that should somebody judge him to be unfortunate and place him low on the scale he would resist accepting such a judgment. Yet very easily does the noninjured make such a judgment regarding the injured.

It is our task to specify further the feelings of the person who considers himself fortunate toward the one whom he considers unfortunate and also the feelings of the person who is considered unfortunate when he knows that he is so considered. Though the relationship as it concerns the injured is in the focus of our attention, the discussion has implications for anyone who is judged unfortunate.

Misfortune As An Event

A painful event which does not have far reaching consequences may be called "a mishap." If the event produces prolonged and more inclusive suffering, if it affects a large part of the life space of the person, it is called "a misfortune." Other people will tend to shift the position of the sufferer downward on the fortune scale. The circumstances surrounding the event may themselves be important. They may affect the feelings of the person himself and the relationship between him and others. But this is a special problem, and fruitful investigation of it presupposes knowledge of the nature of the misfortune relationship. We shall, therefore, in this first study of misfortune, disregard such differences as whether an arm was lost in a car accident or because of shrapnel wounds.

For an investigation of the effect of the circumstances surrounding the event upon the feelings of the person himself, simple grouping into war and accident casualties, for example, would be too superficial. The groupings have rather to be made in terms of the intimate psychological meanings which the circumstances have for the person. For example, in the case of the war wounded: I volunteered and therefore I caused my injury; I was not careful enough I handled explosives too automatically; I got shot when I went out to help my friend it just came; I wanted to be wounded in order to return to the mainland. Moreover, one would have to know whether after his injury the person believes that his loss was for a worthy cause, or whether he became disillusioned, and so on. Similarly, psychologically meaningful subgroups would have to be distinguished for the investigation of the effect of the circumstances upon the evaluation of the donor. We shall emphasize not the nature of the event which produced the change in position on the fortune scale but the consequences of the persisting difference in position between those who are considered fortunate and those who are considered unfortunate.

Misfortune and Suffering

That an unfortunate person suffers is the fact which is outstanding from the point of view of common sense observation. It is also the suffering aspect of misfortune to which people who are close to the sufferer and who share his difficulties predominantly react. We can then ask, "Is the judgment that a person is in an unfortunate position only a statement that he suffers and nothing more?" Are "unfortunate" and "suffering" equivalent? We shall see that there are instances in which the judgment of unfortunate is made in spite of the fact that the person does not suffer, at least not directly from the event itself, and that there are other instances in which suffering occurs and yet the judgment of unfortunate is withheld.

Let us first consider the fact that when suffering is not perceived the person may still be considered unfortunate. This is true, for instance, in the case of a person having a facial disfigurement. It may be objected that, even if the suffering is not perceived, people "realize" that he suffers, and this may have something to do with considering him unfortunate. But, we ask in a provoking way, may it not be this "realization," the opinion of others that he is unfortunate, which makes him suffer, rather than anything independent of these opinions?

It is also puzzling that not all people who experience suffering are considered unfortunate. Boxers, pioneers, members of an arctic expedition are not considered unfortunate. The argument that in such cases the suffering is of short duration does not always hold; the hardships of the pioneers lasted a lifetime. Nor does it help to point out that these sufferings are self imposed and are therefore not misfortunes. It is not strictly true that they are self imposed, especially when they are necessary to gain a livelihood. Moreover, someone who imposes an injury upon himself in attempting to commit suicide is still judged by many to be an unfortunate person.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the statement, "One considers somebody unfortunate when one perceives that he suffers," is unprecise. We shall see in a subsequent section (p. 21) that a statement which is almost the reverse will, paradoxical as it seems, lead us further: "When one considers somebody unfortunate, one will not only expect him to suffer but may even feel that he ought to suffer!"

Misfortune As a Value Loss

In order to understand many of the social emotional relationships arising between the fortunate and the unfortunate we must make explicit one important aspect of misfortune: a misfortune involves, in the eyes of the judge, a loss or absence of something valuable. But the word "misfortune" is sometimes used when the person has experienced no unfortunate event, for example when the injury is congenital. In this case, the absence of a value may be felt psychologically as a loss.

The judgment of misfortune is an expression of personal and social values which the donor holds high. In our culture, most persons do not consider an amputation, a facial scar, or other injuries simply neutral variations, like color of eyes or length of hair. Instead, these variations of "body whole," "body competent," and "body beautiful" are considered disfigurements and handicaps. That is, they are judged to be misfortunes value losses.

The Requirement of Mourning

Since a misfortune is, in the eyes of the judge, a loss of something valuable, the person who experiences a misfortune is generally expected to suffer and mourn his loss. An injured man described the expectations of his visitors in the hospital as follows: "They expected to see me in a worse mental state. I was pretty cheerful and cheered them up." Sometimes these expectations may even have the character of a judgment as to what is proper: it is natural and normal to mourn one's loss when struck by misfortune. It may therefore be disturbing and uncanny to the noninjured to find an injured person who is not distressed, who does not feel and act like an unfortunate person. The noninjured will tend to suspect that the injured person is putting on a good act, or they may conclude that he does not yet realize what has happened to him but "will in time."

We venture to say that these feelings of the donor do not arise solely from the possible intellectual consideration that emotional acceptance of a loss is inconceivable. It is likely that they stem also from the need on the part of the fortunate to keep high those personal and social values which he possesses or cherishes. He therefore objects to the apparent disrespect shown these values as implied in the nonacceptance of the unfortunate position by the person who is deprived of them. When the recipient does not show that he feels unfortunate, the implication is that the loss is not so great, and therefore the donor requires that the recipient mourn. We are now ready to state the following hypothesis: When the fortunate person has a need to safeguard his values, he will either (a) insist that the person he considers unfortunate is suffering (even when he seems not to be suffering) and that he ought to suffer or (b) devaluate the unfortunate person because he ought to suffer and does not.

We expect that the noninjured will resist the implications of this hypothesis. It implies that they want the unfortunate to suffer, which is in direct conflict with prevailing ethical codes. An analysis of several examples will, however, make the hypothesis more convincing.

Consider a woman to whom "position is everything in life." She must consider as unfortunate those who are omitted from the social register. If she does not it would mean that her position is not so valuable after all. If they do not accept the fact that they are unfortunate, she must consider them either too stupid to know better, or insensitive, or shamming; otherwise her own position is threatened.

Or take the attitude of a married woman toward her spinster sister. Perhaps the duties of a wife and mother make up her whole life. If these are not important, then what is she? Nothing. It would be an intolerable state. She must consider single women unfortunate and require that they recognize this position. Otherwise how can she escape insecurity, anxieties, conflicts, and the necessity for revaluation which might increase the importance of other value scales on which she has a low position?

To one who is proud of her beauty, whose sole stock in trade it is, the ugly duckling who flirts and seems happy would be disturbing. The beauty may laugh at the plain one and comment on her appearance so that she will "know her place." If she accepts this place, then she supports and does not challenge the values of the beauty.

For like reasons, it is considered scandalous if a widower remarries too soon. He should have observed a "decent" period of mourning. He is heartless and disrespectful. He threatens the value of strong interpersonal ties. He undermines the value of dependence upon each other in close relationships.

The feelings of the judge which are implicit in the requirement of mourning will tend to be expressed, however, only in covert ways because of the conflict between these feelings and ethical demands. Thus in the following example, though the demand for suffering is not overt, the noninjured subject makes it clear that an injury is devaluating and that the injured should be ashamed of and hide the injury:

The last place I worked there was a girl there who had been born without an arm. It was about to here [indicates above elbow). And she had fingers on it. She didn't care. She used it to hold bobbie pins, etc. ... I didn't think it was very nice. Right in front of the other girls she would uncover it. Would you think that was all right? [Interviewer: What did you feel about it?] It was repulsive. If it had been an amputation it would have seemed cleaner. I thought at the time that I would have gone into the dressing room and do that and not be where so many people could see it.

Misfortune and Devaluation

It has been seen that if a person does not mourn his loss when the donor believes that he ought to he will be devaluated. Mourning his loss does not, however, insure the unfortunate against devaluation. He may be devaluated whether he mourns or not. There remains then the task of determining other conditions under which a person who experienced a misfortune is devaluated.

Devaluation of a person implies comparison. The comparison may be made between two persons in respect to particular characteristics, or between the current state and a previously existing or predicted future state of the same person, or a person may be compared with some abstract norm. The standard of comparison has a position which is evaluated positively and below which any position is negative. Thus, when there is devaluation, the comparisons are not made in neutral terms indicating likeness or difference. Instead, there is always a judgment of better or worse. The position of the person being judged and the standard against which he is compared may be represented on a value scale.

Summarizing, we may say that devaluation presupposes comparison on a value scale on which a person is judged to be in position x, the standard occupying position y, which is higher on the scale. Close consideration of this statement, which sounds so self evident, will show the problems actually involved. Several terms used require further specification. These specifications will help in the task of determining the conditions which lead to devaluation. The terms are "value," "person," "position of the person," and "standard."

Value

We raise the question: Does devaluation occur when a person has lost or lacks any value, or does it occur only when particular values are involved? It would seem that even when something is evaluated highly, the nonpossessor is not necessarily devaluated. Two kinds of values which preclude devaluation can be distinguished—possession values and asset values.

Possession Values. If a value is seen only as a possession of a person and not as a personal characteristic, devaluation of the person cannot take place. Thus beautiful pictures may be evaluated highly, yet those whose homes do not boast of even one old master are not devaluated. Though this seems clear, the terms "personal characteristic" and "possession" are in themselves problematic. Psychologists are uncomfortable when they have to draw a boundary between the person and the environment. Whether something is seen as a part or characteristic of a person or as a possession seems to depend upon the judge. The person who has lost someone dear to him may feel that he has lost part of himself. Clothes may be thought of as a material possession and "being well dressed" as a personal characteristic. Where some judges would perceive a "man who owns a house," others would perceive a "home owner," a substantial and responsible member of the community. Even a part of the body may be thought of simply as a possession rather than as a characteristic of the person, as the following statement of an injured man would seem to imply:

In other words, I kind of think now that the hands and legs are just merely tools. Where if you haven't got the right tool there are some jobs you cannot do. It is not the handicap that holds a man down. It is his head. In the beginning one does not see it— that they are tools.

The general problem will have to be solved: What are the conditions under which a value will be seen as a personal characteristic or simply as a possession?

Asset Values. Even when a value is seen as a personal characteristic, the nonpossessor is not devaluated if the value is regarded as an asset value. When asset values are involved, the person does not base his evaluation upon comparison with any standard. He may, for example, simply enjoy the musical performance of his acquaintance without comparing it with the performance of anyone else. Should the judge not be talented in this regard, he is not disturbed because he is inferior to another. Musical ability in others and himself is seen as an asset value. More generally, the existing state of a person may be felt to be satisfying (or disturbing) without comparing it with a standard. A woman, for example, who is forced because of family and children to give up a vocation which until then had made up a large part of her life will not feel inferior if a vocation represents to her an asset value which is a "fine thing to have" if circumstances permit.

From the above, it is clear that it is not inherent in a value to be considered an asset value. Among other things, the needs of the judge will determine whether or not he is in a comparison frame of reference. Thus, though musical ability may be an asset value under certain circumstances, when the judge is in a comparison frame of reference because he has to select members of an orchestra it is not. In the latter case, we may speak of musical ability as a comparative value, a value used in making comparisons for the purpose of evaluating the person.

We wish to make a sharp distinction between comparative values and the possibility of making comparisons when asset values are in question. In the latter case, comparisons which might be made are intellectual ones which do not affect the evaluation of the person. In the former case, the comparison is the main aspect; whether or not the person is meeting the standard with all its consequences is most important.

Person

We have to distinguish between what we call "total person" and "characteristics of a person." By "total person" we mean all the characteristics which are taken into account by the judge at a given time whether they are clearly or only vaguely perceived. Devaluation can exist in regard to single characteristics and not in regard to others. If the characteristics on which the person is devaluated are "decisive" for the judgment of the total person, total devaluation will take place. But if these characteristics are seen as unimportant, then the person is not devaluated as a total person though he is devaluated on single scales. Moreover, when the single characteristics on which the person is devaluated are the only ones that enter the evaluation of the judge, then "total person" is equivalent to these characteristics and total devaluation takes place.

Consider the example of the noninjured girl who said:

He's correct in not proposing if he couldn't earn a living because of his handicap.

This subject evaluated the injured person as a husband in terms of a single characteristic or scale on which she feels he has an inferior position. Because other characteristics of a good husband are not taken into account, he is necessarily devaluated as a husband. If other characteristics which are felt to be the decisive ones are considered, such as affection and understanding, he may be judged equal to whatever is taken as the standard. He will be devaluated only if the girl feels that earning a living is of primary importance.

Examine similarly the self devaluation of an amputee who says:

You feel like a heel lots of times when kids are playing on the street with their sleds. Other fathers can play with their kids.

The subject devaluates himself because other characteristics which may be considered more important for a good father than those on which he falls short are not considered at the moment.

Devaluation of the injured is not limited to bodily values only. When the injured person is devaluated because of physical performance, appearance, or aptitude for particular roles, a jump is not infrequently made so that he is also devaluated in regard to assumed mental characteristics. Some people directly indicate that abnormality of the body means abnormality of the psychological make up. Thus we have the following statements made by noninjured subjects:

You'd be very conscious of your own deformity; it would hurt you psychologically.

Some have a disposition to arrogance. "You are going to accept me whether you like it or not" like a midget, you know, inferiority complex. Some overdo the matter of being congenial. [Note that even positive traits are seen as negative]

After she [girl with short bowed legs] had been with us for a short while, we accepted her as normal, except for that handicap. [This implies that at first they didn't accept her as normal.]

We should like also to point out that devaluation of the total person does not always occur by way of single characteristics. Sometimes there seems to be a direct, all inclusive judgment of devaluation of the total person. It seems that the broader the meaning of the word "person" the less clearly does the judge perceive how the single scales determine his evaluation of the person. He has a vague feeling, for example, that a "cripple" is somehow "an inferior person."

In speaking about devaluation of a person, then, we must ask two questions. Is his devaluation limited to particular characteristics or is he devaluated as a total person? Is he devaluated because only those scales on which he has a low position are taken into account or because these scales are given considerable weight when the scope of values is enlarged to include other characteristics of the person.

Position of the Person

To a judge, the permanence of a person's position with respect to the standard is important in his evaluation of the person. We may expect that devaluation will be less severe if, when taking the "time perspective" into account, the position of the person is seen to shift in the direction of the standard.* The judge may expect the shift for different reasons. In some cases, he may feel that the loss can be replaced in whole or in part. Thus, even a person who considers "home owner" as a characteristic of the person, and a minimum requirement for the role of a responsible community member, may not devaluate someone who suffers the misfortune of having his house destroyed. The judge may expect that he will again be able to establish a home and thereby to regain his former position. The loss is only temporary.

In other cases, the person may be expected to adjust to his loss even though the lost value cannot be regained. The position of the person, then, is felt to shift so that he can meet the standards in regard to such values as, for example, adequate personality, social usefulness, and the like. For problems of injuries, the shift due to perception of adjustability is of particular importance. Even in those instances in which physical improvement can be limited only, the recognition that one can adjust to the injured state will minimize de valuative feelings. A noninjured woman says:

When I thought of the courage it took to ignore those handicaps, I felt humble. I felt that anyone who overcomes a handicap like that wins an added amount of respect from everyone.

For this subject, the fact that the injured men were able to adjust to their handicaps led her to evaluate them not as inferior but, on the contrary, as persons meriting respect.

We believe further that the judgment of adjustability will depend upon the adjustment of the judge. A person who feels in essence "What a terrible misfortune to be injured, I could never stand it. I would rather die," we consider maladjusted with respect to injuries. The following comments were made by noninjured people:

It wouldn't be worth while to live. I'd develop a complex and go off in my little hole. I'd go into hiding and not show my face for the rest of my life.

To such people it will seem impossible that one can adjust to injuries.

Standard

In connection with the term "standard," we have previously noted that the standard may be another person, the same person at a different time, or some abstract norm. Frequently the abstract norm has the character of the minimum requirement for a certain role. If the person does not meet the minimum requirement, he will be judged as an unacceptable candidate for whatever role is in question (for example, that of husband, employee, team member, etc.) or he will be devaluated as unfit to continue in the role. This is illustrated by the noninjured girl who said:

He's correct in not proposing if he couldn't earn a living because of his handicap.

In the extreme case of devaluation of the total person, the person will be thought of as an outcast. He does not meet the minimum requirements on a value scale which, in the opinion of the judge, everyone "ought to possess" in order to be a normal human being. Though such extreme devaluation is not often directly expressed, we do find, in the records of the noninjured, statements such as the following when severe handicaps are being discussed:

If you have no limbs you are not a person really. With both arms and legs gone the person isn't of any use, a detriment to society.

When a person is above the level of minimum requirements or "ought standard" (either for a particular role or for a "normal" human being), he may still be devaluated as inferior, for example in comparison with some other person, but the devaluation will not be as severe.

There are individual differences in regard to where the ought standard is set. For some it is simply undeniable that a man ought to be able to support his family entirely by his own efforts. If he is disabled so that his wife must work, or if state assistance is required, he will be seen to fall short of this minimum requirement and will be judged unworthy to have a family. Some people may not see this as an ought standard at all; others may apply it to themselves and yet not require anyone else to meet it.

We can now state that the most severe type of devaluation (devaluation as unworthy or unacceptable) will occur when the person, in the eyes of the judge, falls below the ought standard on a value scale.

Conclusion

It is obvious by now that the value structure of the judge is of utmost importance. Devaluation will depend upon whether the judge regards the values in question as possessions or as personal characteristics. It will depend upon whether the judge considers the values as comparative values or as asset values. It will depend upon whether the judge regards the person only in terms of single value scales on which he has a low position; whether the judge regards these values as decisive in the context of other characteristics of the person, that is, when the scope of values is enlarged; or whether in this context they are felt to be nonessential. It will depend upon whether or not the judge regards the state of the person as an unadjustable one. It is up to the judge how high the standards will be set, whether he considers a particular standard an ought standard for his concept of the role of husband, father, etc., or of a "normal" person, and whether the standards are flexible or rigid. It is not the objective loss but the values of the judge which determine devaluation. A remedy, therefore, is a change in the value system of the judge. The judge may be another person, or the person himself who experiences the loss. In the first case we speak of the devaluation of someone else, in the second case of self devaluation.

Conflict in the Noninjured

Devaluation of the injured, like the requirem